Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry by KWM Fulford & Tim Thornton & George Graham

Author:KWM Fulford & Tim Thornton & George Graham
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2006-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

Causation and probability

We touched on an important criticism of Mackie (1993) earlier. This is that Mackie's model is a limited form of sufficient condition while we now acknowledge the role of causal relations that are not sufficient, in a logical sense, for their effects.

Recall that on the INUS account, a cause involves a condition that is unnecessary but, given an assumed causal field, is sufficient for its effects. It is sufficient in the circumstances. But many sciences invoke notions of causation that are weaker than this. They construe causation as a relation that can occur even if the cause only makes the effect probable. The next approach to analysing causation discussed in this chapter considers just such a proposal and argues against it to the effect that causation cannot be definitionally reduced to a probabilistic or statistical notion.

Exercise 6 (20 minutes)

Read the short extract from:

Cartwright, N. (1983). Causal laws and effective strategies. In How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–42 (extract: pp. 23–25)

Link with Reading 15.5

What are Cartwright's arguments against a probabilistic account of causation?

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